

AFRO BAROMETER

Working Paper No. 64

**Crime and Support for Democracy:
Revisiting Modernization Theory.**

by Kenneth E. Fernandez and Michelle Kuenzi

**A comparative series of national public
attitude surveys on democracy, markets
and civil society in Africa.**



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Crime and Support for Democracy: Revisiting Modernization Theory

Abstract

We revisit the literature on modernization theory and note that the theory posits that both increases in wealth and increases in crime rates accompany modernization. This fact is often ignored by much of the scholarship on democratization, which generally focuses on economic conditions. Using 2003 survey data from the Afrobarometer and the Latinbarometer, we examine how victimization and perceptions of crime influence citizens' attitudes toward democracy. Analysis of four countries (Chile, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Malawi) shows that a citizen's perception of public safety is as an important factor as any socio-economic variable in predicting support for and satisfaction with democracy. This finding is important because the consolidation of democracy is thought to require widespread support for democracy among a country's citizenry.

Introduction

Until recently, few studies, especially in the field of political science, have examined crime and its impact on society in a comparative manner (Beirne 1997; Howard, Newman, and Pridemore 2000). We argue in this paper that understanding the impact of crime in the study of comparative political development is necessary for several reasons. First, crime, crime control and criminal punishment are arguably some of the most important issues facing a society. Garland (1990) suggests that the way a society deals with crime and punishes its social deviants can tell us much about that society. The question of how to balance between freedom, equality, and order is a fundamental issue in governance and closely associated with the principles of democracy. Second, current public opinion research suggests that the issue of crime and public safety is of great concern to citizens across the globe (Quann and Hung 2002). Third, many countries that have experienced recent democratic reforms have also experienced increasing crime rates (Burianek 1998; Bergman 2006). This is especially true for the emerging democracies in Africa and Latin America, which have crime rates that are significantly higher than the global average. We contend that crime and public safety are critical factors in the consolidation of democracy in these countries, factors that have been ignored in much of the literature.

Hiskey and Bowler (2005) contend that now, after a 30-year trend in democratization around the world, the question of why a country is democratic or not is slowly being replaced by the question of whether democracy will be strengthened and consolidated in a particular country. The success of democratic consolidation in these emerging democracies is often linked to citizens' support for democracy and perceptions of government performance (Hiskey and Bowler 2005; Lagos 2001; Diamond 1999; Lipset 1959). Norris (1999: 2) suggest that low levels of support for democracy may increase the risk of leadership coups, ethnic conflict, extreme nationalist parties, or the erosion of political rights and liberties.

Borrowing from the political science *and* the criminology/sociology literatures on modernization theory we argue that, as well as socio-economic conditions, *crime* and *public safety* influence citizens' views on democracy. Lipset's (1959) conceptualization of the theory posits that modernization leads to increasing wealth, leading to an increase in citizen support for democracy. We support such a proposition, but simply argue that modernization may also lead to increases in crime and victimization (Durkheim 1893; Clinard and Abbot 1973) and that this may produce a barrier to democratic consolidation. Therefore, any application of the modernization theory to democratization needs to incorporate both conditions: increasing wealth and increasing crime. Using public opinion data from the Afrobarometer and Latinbarometer we test the hypothesis that, at the individual level, experience with crime and negative perceptions of public safety reduce support for democratic governance and increase support for non-democratic alternatives.

Crime, Democracy and Modernization Theory

To study the relationship between crime and democracy one needs to bridge or connect the two fields and the theories that inform them. This is not an easy task; even within disciplines there are "islands of research that often do not communicate well with each other" (Hastedt 2001: 215). Nonetheless, the study of crime and the study of democracy do share some common theoretical lenses. Modernization theory has had a long history in both comparative studies of crime and comparative studies of political development. The theory, in both crime and democracy contexts, assumes that each nation goes through similar phases of development.

In regard to political development, modernization theory argues that democracy results from society becoming more socially and economically diverse. When a society evolves from subsistence agriculture to modern industrial life, a variety of structural and social changes occur, including, the increase in per capita incomes. This increase in wealth is coincided by gains in literacy, education, and urbanization. Citizens in these more economically (and socially) evolved nations are less willing to endure oppressive

authoritarian governments and more ready to support the establishment of democratic systems (Lipset 1959).

With respect to crime, modernization theory posits that industrialization and urbanization produce a rapid increase in the complexity of social and economic relations. Technical and industrial development reshapes economic, market and labor relations. These transformations in turn change social relations by increasing social differentiation and, potentially, increasing inequality. Industrialization and urbanization may well cause a breakdown in traditional structures and values, and an increase in social interaction, tension, and conflict. These social changes then contribute to the emergence of criminal activity (Durkheim 1983; Heiland and Shelley 1992).

Merging these two threads of modernization theory produces a more nuanced understanding of the democratization process. Looking at the theory through lenses from both sociology and political science, we see that modernization not only produces increases in per capita income or GDP but it also, as Durkheim (1893) predicted, produces increases in crime and victimization. One facilitates the transition to democracy, the other, we theorize, impedes it. Traditional application or testing of the modernization theory in political science often has a myopic focus on per capita income or GDP as the most crucial factor leading to democracy (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Epstein et al. 2006). In fact, Kugler and Feng describe modernization theory as positing that “economic development is a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for democratic transitions” (1999: 140).

We are not arguing against the proposition that economic development is integrally linked to democratization. In the aggregate it is difficult to dismiss the connection between economic development and democratic transition, yet at the regime level it is hard to ignore that in some countries transition to democracy can also be quickly followed by a breakdown in democratic regimes (Berhard et al 2001). We argue here that to more fully understand how modernization influences political development, especially in emerging democracies, scholars need to include in their analyses other societal conditions that coincide with modernization. Borrowing from this older tradition in modernization theory we argue that crime and victimization are important variables that need to be included in the study of democratic transitions and consolidation. An examination of the consolidation of democracy that incorporates crime in addition to socioeconomic variables provides a much more realistic application of the modernization theory and may help explain why some countries may “slide back” to non-democratic practices.

Testing Modernization Theory: Macro Or Micro Level Analysis?

Since its inception, there has been substantial debate on how well modernization theory explains the variation in democratization across the globe (for support see Jackman 1973; Feng 1997; Epstein et al. 2006; for a critique see O'Donnell 1973; Arat 1988; Przeworski et al. 2000). Much of the research testing modernization theory uses a macro-level approach with the nation-state at time t as the unit of analysis. Aggregate national characteristics such as per capita GDP or literacy rates are then used as predictors of some measure of democracy (i.e., transition to, or level of, democracy).

We do not dispute the usefulness of such a macro-level approach, but rather argue that the underlying assumptions and processes of the modernization theory are in some cases inherently micro-level in nature. For instance, Lipset (1959) posits that increases in wealth and income lead to democratic transition because it affects citizens' values and “receptivity to democratic tolerance norms (p.84).” Opening up the “black box” of modernization theory we see that per capita income does not directly change political institutions; instead, it changes citizens' attitudes and beliefs, which in turn causes changes in citizen behavior, which then changes political rules and institutions. We make a similar contention about crime and its effect on the democratization process. The presence of personal insecurity as a result of crime

influences (negatively) citizens' attitudes regarding liberal democracy and thus influences the likelihood of the successful consolidation of democracy.

The idea that a deficit of public safety undermines support for political regimes has been hinted at by scholars both in and outside of a comparative context. Christensen and Per Lægveid (2002) argue that citizen support for a regime or political system depends on what they get from that system. Moraski and Reisinger (2003) suggest that for democracy to thrive a relatively large proportion of people need to believe that democracy will make their lives better and improve the prospects for their children. They conclude that democracy accompanied by misery may lead to fragile governmental institutions. This line of thinking is similar to the political economy and public choice approach where citizens are considered similar to consumers in a market and where political institutions (democratic or otherwise) are expected to produce some utility (Mitchell 1983).

We argue that such statements regarding citizen values and support for democracy seem best explored and tested using micro-level survey data. Since the underlying assumption of our hypothesized relationship between crime and democratic stability is that crime and public safety influence public attitudes then an individual level analysis seems appropriate before moving to the aggregate level.¹

Crime and the Consolidation of Democracy

As mentioned above, many scholars contend that the strengthening of democratic norms in emerging democracies greatly depends on society's view – or citizen evaluations – of democracy. This line of research generally examines how the economic performance of a government affects the likelihood of democracies forming or surviving (Berhard, et al, 2001; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). These studies find that strong economic performance ameliorates socioeconomic conflicts in society and reduces citizen discontent, thereby increasing the likelihood of a democracy enduring. This line of research logically links citizen evaluation of government performance with democratic regime endurance. If democratic governments fail to perform they will lose support from citizens.

In this paper we make a similar argument, but focus on the connection between levels of crime and democratic survival and consolidation, rather than economic performance, which we believe has too often dominated the discourse on democratization. We suggest that public safety is as important an issue as economic performance. If public safety interferes with the quality of life of citizens then the survival of democracy may be threatened. In the presence of high crime, the public may prefer stability over democratic competition and elite turnover.

Very few studies have explored this contention. Alvazzi Del Frate (1998) and Goldsmith (2003) find that the populations in some developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia are quite supportive of swift and harsh punishment without judicial proceedings. These attitudes might threaten the survival of newly established democratic reforms and institutions (Rauch 2002). One opinion survey in El Salvador in 1999 did find that 55 percent of respondents stated crime (delincuencia) was a justification for a coup d'etat [Justificación para golpe de estado] (Seligson et al, 2000: 158). Perez (2003-4), using two nationwide surveys conducted in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1999, found that a sense of security in one's

¹ It should also be noted that gathering reliable, valid, and comparable aggregate measures of crime and victimization across countries in the developing world is problematic. The International Crime Victimization Survey (1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the World Health Organization (WHO) do compile some types of victimization rates, but the criminology literature suggests that the quality and comparability of these figures are questionable (Neapolitan 1998; Mushanga 1992; Huang and Wellford 1989).

neighborhood was associated with higher levels of support for the national civil police and less support for an authoritarian regime.

Similar evidence may be found in the new democracies in Eastern Europe. During the 1990s the Czech Republic saw increases in crime following the transition to democracy. One quarter of the adult population in the Czech Republic reported they were victims of some type of crime (Burianek 1998). The public responded with demands for increased repression of criminals. Survey data showed that 88 percent of respondents in the Czech Republic felt that "the maintenance of order in the state" was the most important issue facing the nation. Such attitudes could easily threaten support and trust for police and courts and these, in turn, can affect attitudes toward democracy itself. Gordy's (2004) discussion of criminal activity and violence in Serbia suggests that in 2003 the Serbian public's lack of faith in judicial institutions damaged the legitimacy of democratic reformers and perhaps helped lead the legislature to a vote of no confidence in the government.

The issue of "deepening" newly emergent democracies is particularly relevant for developing areas such as Latin America and Africa where the stability of democratic institutions and regimes has been called into question. Many scholars wonder if some newly established democratic reforms will be deepened or if such reforms will be replaced with former authoritarian practices. The ability of these regimes to produce both economic security and public order and safety may be a crucial element to answering this question.

The dramatic political changes and reforms that occurred in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s have in some cases coincided with increases in crime and victimization. Africa has some of the highest rates of violent crime and victimization in the world (McIlwaine 1999). Latin America has a longer history with democratic reforms but comparable crime rates. In fact the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) found that Latin America had some of the highest rates of "contact crimes" (robbery, assault with force, and sexual assault) among the 70 countries participating in the study (Alvazzi del Frate 2002). At the same time Lagos (2001) notes that there has been a notable erosion of support for democracy in the region. We suggest that such violence and insecurity poses a direct threat to the sustainability of these democratic reforms. This argument may not be new to some. Powdthavee (2005) states that *politicians* around the world have been greatly concerned about crime because of its impact on the public's fear, perception of personal safety, and general happiness and quality of life. Yet Powdthavee (2005) argues that scholars have given little attention to the links between crime, social wellbeing, and quality of life.

Moreover, perceptions of personal insecurity due to crime may give rise to non-democratic responses among the citizenry, which poses a direct threat to the consolidation of democracy. Diamond notes "In the context of weak states and inefficient, poorly disciplined police, crime may inspire drastic, illegal, unconstitutional, and grotesquely sadistic responses to try to control it" (1999, 91). The non-democratic responses to rising crime rates and poor government performance in the area of crime and safety are evident in countries throughout Latin America and Africa. In some Latin American and African countries, the ineffectiveness (or perceived ineffectiveness) of legal institutions has rendered mob justice the most prevalent way of addressing crime. Adinkrah attributes the rise of vigilantism in Ghana to "...an under-resourced police force, poor police-civilian relations, burgeoning crime rate, a slow, overburdened judiciary, heightened public fear of crime, and a breakdown in traditional methods of dispute resolution" (2005, 413). In Liberia, the Justice Ministry has actually called on citizens to organize vigilante groups to cope with the rise in crime, which, the Ministry admits, the police have been unable to address effectively (Ledgerhood 2006).

Hypotheses

An underlying promise of democracy is that people who are dissatisfied with the performance of the government have a chance to oust the responsible office holders via the electoral process. Thus, the legitimacy of democracy is constantly being renewed (Huntington 1991). Poor government performance, in the short term, should not then cause people to lose faith in a democratic regime but rather in the incumbent political officials who comprise the underperforming government. Many note, however, that the large wellspring of popular support for democratic rule that sees a democratic regime through crises is not likely to exist in the emerging democracies. As Bratton et al. (2005) observe, support for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is widespread but shallow.

In addition, the *raison d'être* of government is the provision of public goods. Security is perhaps the most basic public good government is expected to supply. Indeed, Thomas Hobbes saw human beings' desire for security as being the main reason they would engage in a social contract and submit to government. All governments are expected to supply the baseline public goods of public order and the protection of private property. If the government of a country is unable to perform in this area, then it is likely and understandable that people will become disillusioned with the regime with which the government is associated.

Based on these considerations, we hypothesize that:

- Those who have recently had experience with crime will be less supportive of democracy than those who have not.
- Those who have favorable assessments of public safety will be more supportive of democracy than those who do not.

Data, Cases Selection And Method

The empirical analysis is based on surveys administered by the Afrobarometer project in Malawi (2003, N = 1,208) and Nigeria (2003, N = 2,428) and the Latinbarometer Corporation in Chile (2003, N = 1200) and Nicaragua (2003, N = 1010). The Afrobarometer used a “clustered, stratified, multi-stage probability” sampling design in order to obtain “national probability samples that represent an accurate cross section of the voting age population” in these two countries.² The Latinbarometer use a “trietapic sample, probabilistic in the first two stages and age/sex quota in the last stage” with 100% coverage in Nicaragua and 70% coverage in Chile.³

Case Selection

The Afrobarometer and the Latinbarometer together contain 35 countries (18 in Africa and 17 in Latin America). A separate analysis of all cases would be impractical so we narrowed the study to four cases; two from Africa and two from Latin America.⁴ A focus on Latin America and Africa can be justified because these emerging democracies are known for their fragility. In addition, Epstein et al. (2006) argue that “partial democracies” are the most important and least understood regime type and should be made a focus in the study of democratization.

Our initial analysis began with Nigeria, which, like many other sub-Saharan African countries, experienced a transition to democracy in the 1990s. We chose Nigeria because the popular and academic literature has suggested that crime is a highly salient issue in this country. According to Harnischfeger

² <http://www.afrobarometer.org/methods.html>

³ Latinbarometre CD-ROM 2003.

⁴ Because the Afrobarometer and Latinbarometro have some differences in wording, pooling across continents is not possible. We were also interested in seeing how the results might vary across different cases. An analysis pooling all 17 countries in the 2003 Latinbarometro is provided in the Appendix. The results are remarkable similar.

(2003), “Nigeria’s police and judiciary have failed to protect its citizens and have therefore lost all credibility...The breakdown of state institutions has prompted citizens in many parts of Nigeria to resort to self-help by creating vigilante groups and armed militias” (2003, 23). In other words, it appears that citizens may have embraced non-democratic methods of addressing issues of crime and security in this context.

To select the other African case we used the logic of the “most different systems design” (see Przeworski and Teune 1970) and performed a cluster analysis to find a case in the Afrobarometer data that was “most different” in relation to three factors: crime, democracy and per capita GDP. The results showed Malawi had the largest Euclidean distance from Nigeria.⁵ Nigeria has a per capita GDP nearly 3 times that of Malawi, and Nigeria has a substantially higher reported victimization rate (Nigeria had the highest reported attacks of the 14 African cases and Malawi had the lowest). Both countries were given a score of 4 for political rights and civil liberties by *Freedom House* in 2005.⁶ The same method was used to choose two Latin American countries with the exception that Mexico was excluded from the analysis. We excluded Mexico for several reasons. Its large per capita GDP (in relation to other countries in the dataset) in conjunction with the fact that the calculation of the squared Euclidean distance is greatly influenced by variables measured in larger values (like per capita GDP) produced results that showed Mexico was the “most different” from every other Latin American case. In addition to this, its close proximity and relationship to the U.S. made it a distinctive case.

The Euclidean distance scores produced by the cluster analysis of the remaining 16 cases identified Chile and Nicaragua as the two cases that are “most different.” Both Chile and Nicaragua have modest crime rates compared to the rest of Central and South America, but differ greatly on GDP and level of democracy. Chile has a per capita GDP almost 7 times higher than Nicaragua and Chile has a Freedom House score of 1 for both political rights and civil liberties while Nicaragua has a score of 3 for both.

Although the Euclidean distance scores are arguably a crude way of selecting the cases it made the selection process more systematic and less capricious. These cases allow us to test the relationship between perceptions of crime and attitudes toward democracy in a variety of settings. There is substantial variation in per capita GDP across cases: they vary in crime rates from moderate to high levels of victimization; and levels of political freedom and civil liberties vary from the highest (score of 1 for Chile) to moderately low (score of 4 for Nigeria and Malawi).

Conceptualization and Operationalization

The Afrobarometer and the Latinbarometer provide rich sources of survey data and instruments that allow us to measure attitudes regarding democracy and crime in a variety of ways. Below is a brief discussion of how we operationalize the concepts and constructs used in the regression models that follow.⁷

Dependent Variables

Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy

Widespread support for democracy among the citizenry and political class alike is thought to be a requisite for the consolidation of democracy (Lipset 1958; Diamond 1999). We measure popular support for democracy with a question that asks whether respondents think that democracy is the most preferable

⁵ The Euclidean distance between two cases is calculated by finding the square root of the sum of the squared differences between the two cases for each of the three variables: $\sqrt{(x_i - x_j)^2 + (y_i - y_j)^2 + (z_i - z_j)^2}$

⁶ The score ranges from 1 to 7 where 1 is the highest level of Freedom (The U.S. has a score of 1 in both categories and Saudi Arabia has a score of 7).

⁷ Please see the appendix for the wording of the questions used for each measure.

form of government. Both the Afrobarometer and the Latinbarometer pose this question in basically the exact wording (see Appendix).

Mass satisfaction with “the way democracy works” is also examined. Satisfaction with democracy is related to support for democracy, but it is a separate phenomenon. While respondents’ endorsement of democracy reflects their preference for democracy in principle, satisfaction with democracy reflects respondents’ feelings about their experiences under the new regime. As Bratton et al. observe, “the former [support for democracy] tends to embody deeply held political values, while the latter reacts to the political exigencies of the day” (2005, 93). We view things a bit differently. Numerous studies have shown a disconnect between people’s stated support for civil liberties and the position they take on concrete situations at which civil liberties are at issue. That is, people are much more apt to support civil liberties in the abstract than they are in concrete situations (Prothro and Grigg 1960). Similarly, as others have noted, expressing support for democracy is the politically correct attitude in most areas of the world. However, the practical application of democratic principles to people’s concrete situations might be different. As Bratton et al. (2005) note, the relationship between support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives is not that strong, at least in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, expressing support for democracy does not necessarily reflect “deeply held values,” but instead may reflect people’s general affect toward the ideal of democracy as a regime type. Both the Afrobarometer and the Latinbarometer ask similarly worded and conceptually equivalent questions regarding satisfaction with democracy.

We attempt to test the application of democratic principles by using a measure that asks respondents about concrete preferences regarding the future of democracy in their countries. In the Afrobarometer surveys, respondents were asked to choose between two statements. One statement was that the elected government should be given more time to deal with the problems it has inherited. The other statement was that, should the present system not be able to produce results soon, other forms of government should be considered. Higher values on this variable correspond to less support for democracy.

Similarly, the Latinbarometer asked a question regarding a respondent’s agreement with the following statement, “I would not mind a non democratic government in power if it could solve economic problems.” In Chile 15.9 percent of respondents strongly agreed and 41.5 percent agreed with the statement. In Nicaragua 15.5 percent strongly agreed and 64.3 percent agreed with this statement.

Independent Variables

Comparative assessments of safety from crime and violence

We are interested in how people’s experience with crime and perception of safety affect their views of democracy. Both the Afrobarometer and Latinbarometer contain several questions regarding the issue of crime.

Experience with crime

In Nigeria and Malawi we use respondent reports of whether they, or a member of their family, had been the victim of a burglary or attack over the past year. Forty percent of Nigerian respondents reported that they or a family member had been so victimized, while 26.8% of Malawians said so. In Chile and Nicaragua respondents were asked whether they had been victims of a crime in the past 12 months. In Chile, 33.8% of respondents reported an experience with crime and, in Nicaragua, 29.7% of respondents did so.

Perceptions of Crime

We measure people’s perception of the severity of the crime problem in several ways. Both surveys ask respondents whether the country is becoming safer or less safe (see Appendix for wording). In addition, the Afrobarometer asks respondents how well or how badly the current government is handling the

problem of crime control. Similarly, the Latinbarometer ask respondents to reflect on whether the country is winning the war on crime and delinquency. Higher values on all of these variables correspond to more positive appraisals of government performance regarding crime reduction.

Control Variables

We include several control variables including the demographic variables of gender, level of poverty, and age. In addition, an individual’s political awareness and engagement, identification with the party in power, and subjective assessments of satisfaction with life and the economy and government performance have been linked to attitudes toward the government and democracy in the literature (see, for example, Mishler and Rose 1999; Bratton et al. 2005). We therefore include these variables as controls in the model.

The great similarities between the Afrobarometer and Latinbarometer allow us to replicate virtually identical statistical models across country cases from both continents. Some differences do remain. An indicator of political partisanship was not available for the Latin American data and therefore replication of the variable RULING PARTY, which indicates a respondent that identifies with the ruling party, was not possible. Some wording differences in the survey questions prevent an exact replication but the items used are always conceptually equivalent (See Appendix).

	Support Democracy	Satisfaction with Democracy	More Time for Democracy to Work
Nigeria 2000	81%	85%	83%
Nigeria 2001	73	57	75
Nigeria 2003	69	34	59
Malawi 1999	65	57	*
Malawi 2003	66	48	36

Source: Afrobarometer

*question was not asked

Table 2: Attitudes Toward Democracy in Latin America			
	Support for Democracy	Satisfaction with Democracy	Support for Authoritarian Government
Chile 1996	54%	29%	19%
Chile 2000	55	34	18
Chile 2003	52	34	15
Chile 2004	62	44	14
Nicaragua 1996	64	25	15
Nicaragua 2000	68	17	6
Nicaragua 2003	59	34	12
Nicaragua 2004	50	23	13

Source: Latinbarometer

Support for Democracy in Africa and Latin America

How high are levels of support for democracy in the countries of study? As we can see in Table 1, reported support for democracy as a regime type appears relatively high in the two African countries of study. In the case of Nigeria, however, we see that the level of support has declined with each new round of the Afrobarometer survey. Bratton et al. (2005) note the fall in support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy between the Round 1 (2000) and Round 1.5 (2001) surveys in Nigeria. As can be seen, the percentage of people expressing support for democracy declines again between Round 1.5 and Round 2 (2003) of the survey. The level of support for democracy is lower in Malawi but stable between the first and second rounds of the survey. With regard to satisfaction with the way democracy is working, the fall in level of satisfaction is astounding in Nigeria. The percentage of Nigerians expressing satisfaction with democracy fell from 85% in 2000 to 34% in 2003, a drop of fifty-one percentage points. The decline in satisfaction in Malawi between 1999 and 2003 is much less dramatic, but only a minority in both of the African countries studied now express satisfaction with democracy. The percentage of Nigerians showing political patience (by giving the democratic regime more time to address inherited problems) also decreases across the rounds of the survey, and, in Malawi, only about one third are willing to give the elected government more time. The results displayed in Table 1 support the notion that people are more likely to express support for democracy in the abstract than in more concrete situations. Although the levels of support for democracy appear to decline across time for the Latin American countries studied, the pattern is not as clear (see Table 2).

TABLE 3: ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY

Est. Method	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Support for Democracy (Nigeria)	Support for Democracy (Malawi)	Satisfaction w/ Democracy (Nigeria)	Satisfaction w/ Democracy (Malawi)	More Time (Nigeria)	More Time (Malawi)
	Logit	Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit
Feel Safer	0.241*** (0.044)	-0.023 (0.052)	0.389*** (0.038)	0.086* (0.045)	-0.145*** (0.037)	-0.050 (0.046)
Victim of Crime	-0.245*** (0.095)	0.144 (0.161)	-0.032 (0.082)	-0.001 (0.133)	0.163** (0.079)	0.173 (0.141)
Ruling Party	0.034 (0.11)	-0.116 (0.156)	0.370*** (0.093)	0.863*** (0.131)	0.138 (0.091)	-0.766*** (0.135)
Discuss Politics	0.051 (0.039)	0.025 (0.050)	0.051 (0.033)	-0.078* (0.043)	0.018 (0.033)	0.103** (0.044)
Radio- News	0.147*** (0.046)	-0.05 (0.052)	0.013 (0.041)	0.179*** (0.046)	-0.016 (0.040)	0.014 (0.046)
Service Delivery	0.113*** (0.044)	0.207*** (0.052)	0.180*** (0.038)	0.402*** (0.046)	-0.068* (0.037)	-0.134*** (0.047)
Economy	0.075* (0.044)	0.047 (0.072)	0.416*** (0.038)	0.209*** (0.060)	-0.119*** (0.036)	0.088 (0.064)
Quality of Life	-0.107** (0.046)	0.008 (0.075)	0.177*** (0.04)	0.034 (0.064)	0.045 (0.038)	-0.098 (0.067)
Education	-0.023 (0.025)	0.117** (0.053)	-0.048** (0.021)	-0.144*** (0.042)	-0.017 (0.020)	0.135*** (0.045)
Poor	-0.052 (0.06)	-0.135 (0.110)	-0.167*** (0.051)	-0.324*** (0.092)	-0.131*** (0.049)	0.127 (0.097)
Female	-0.031 (0.099)	-0.373*** (0.147)	0.016 (0.084)	-0.435*** (0.125)	-0.027 (0.082)	-0.006 (0.130)
Age	0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.0003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.005)
Cons	-.454 (0.327)	0.061 (.502)				
# obs	2259	976	2268	988	2194	968
Pseudo R ²	.0311	.0319	.1073	.1046	.0095	.0391
LR chi ²	87.28	39.19	645.22	297.96	56.55	89.90
Prob > chi ²	.0000	.0001	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Notes: *** $p \leq .01$ for two tailed test; ** $p \leq .05$ for two tailed test; * $p \leq .1$ for two tailed test

Results – Sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria and Malawi

What are the factors that affect attitudes toward democracy in all these countries? Do perceptions of safety and experience with crime directly affect support for democracy in the short term? Since our dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logistical regression (logit) to estimate the effects of the variables of interest on support for democracy. Based on the results displayed in the first model of Table 3 for Nigeria, we can see that the hypotheses are supported by the results. Indeed, feeling that one is safer under the democratic regime has a significant positive effect on Nigerians' propensity to express support for democracy. On the other hand, having experience with crime in the last year has a significant negative effect on Nigerians' support for democracy. The signs in front of the coefficients for feeling safer and experience with crime are not in the expected directions in the model of support for democracy for Malawi, but the coefficients are far from significant. Support for democracy is a somewhat esoteric concept and crime is not a particularly salient issue in Malawi, so perhaps the results are not too surprising. On the other hand, Nigerians were known for their enthusiasm for democracy during the transition period, and crime is an extremely salient issue in Nigeria. Thus, both the concept of democracy and issue of crime appear to have greater resonance in Nigeria than Malawi.

Is mass satisfaction with democracy affected by issues of crime and safety? If so, how do perceptions and experiences of crime influence how people assess the performance of democracy? As can be seen in Table 3, Nigerians who think that personal safety has improved under the democratic regime are significantly more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works than those who offer more negative assessments. The coefficient for experience with crime is in the expected negative direction but it is not significant for this model. The model as a whole is highly significant. The results for Malawi are similar, although the coefficient for feeling safer is only significant at a relaxed ($p = <0.10$) level.

As seen in Model 3, Nigerians who feel safer under the new democratic regime are also more likely to reject the notion that a new regime type should be sought. Even if they think the problems inherited from the authoritarian regime remain unsolved, they are still willing to give the democratic regime more time to address the problems. ("More time" is coded so that lower values reflect the attitude that more time should be given to the democratic regime.) But those Nigerians touched by crime are less likely to want to give the democratic regime more time. As can be seen in Model 3 for Malawi in Table 3, the signs in front of the coefficients for feeling safer and experience with crime are in the same direction, but neither achieves significance.

In general, it appears that experience with crime does affect attitudes toward democracy in the predicted manner in Nigeria, but has little such influence in Malawi. On the other hand, people's perception of relative safety exhibits a strong, consistent effect on attitudes toward democracy, especially in Nigeria. Nigerians who feel that the situation vis-à-vis crime and safety under the democratic regime is better than under the former authoritarian regime are more likely express support for democracy. In addition, those who feel that the crime situation is better are significantly more likely to be satisfied with democracy in both Nigeria and Malawi. Nigerians who feel that the crime situation has improved are also more politically patient and less likely to entertain the notion that perhaps a new regime-type should be found. (Again, higher values on this variable, "more time," correspond to less support for democracy.)

As noted earlier, we want to measure people's perception of crime and safety in as rich a manner as possible. Thus, we also examine how people's assessment of government performance in the area of crime reduction influences their feelings about democracy and the democratic regime in place in their country. As can be seen in Table 4, assessments of government performance in the area of crime reduction affects attitudes toward democracy in a manner very similar to that of perceptions of crime and safety from violence. In fact, perceptions of crime performance have an especially strong effect on satisfaction with democracy in Nigeria (see Model 5 for Nigeria). With reference to the model of

satisfaction with democracy for Malawi, the coefficient for crime performance is positive and significant at the .01 level. Thus, crime performance seems tightly linked with satisfaction with the way democracy is working in both Malawi and Nigeria.

In general, it appears that Malawians' and Nigerians' attitudes toward democracy are not so much affected by objective conditions as by perceptions of government performance. It is the perceived capacity of government to bring down crime rates that appears to drive attitudes toward democracy, not personal experience with crime. Likewise, if we look at the performance of the control variables across the models in Tables 3 and 4, we can see that people's perception of government service delivery is more consistently important for favorable attitudes toward democracy than their perceptions of the state of the national economy or the quality of their own lives.

TABLE 4: ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY II

Est. Method	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Support for Democracy (Nigeria)	Support for Democracy (Malawi)	Satisfaction w/ Democracy (Nigeria)	Satisfaction w/ Democracy (Malawi)	More Time (Nigeria)	More Time (Malawi)
	Logit	Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit
Govt. Reducing Crime	0.196*** (0.056)	0.007 (0.079)	0.525*** (0.048)	0.290*** (0.070)	-0.162*** (0.046)	-0.112 (0.071)
Victim of Crime	-0.249*** (0.094)	0.134 (0.160)	0.008 (0.081)	0.049 (0.132)	0.169** (0.079)	0.142 (0.141)
Ruling Party	0.058 (0.11)	-0.114 (0.156)	0.349*** (0.093)	0.863*** (0.131)	0.134 (0.091)	-0.769*** (0.136)
Discuss Politics	0.055 (0.038)	0.031 (0.050)	0.046 (0.033)	-0.074* (0.043)	0.014 (0.033)	0.105** (0.044)
Radio-News	0.148*** (0.046)	-0.053 (0.052)	0.020 (0.040)	0.169*** (0.046)	-0.027 (0.039)	0.013 (0.046)
Service Delivery	0.141*** (0.043)	0.199*** (0.052)	0.212*** (0.038)	0.397*** (0.046)	-0.075** (0.037)	-0.136*** (0.048)
Economy	0.082* (0.043)	0.056 (0.072)	0.411*** (0.039)	0.219*** (0.061)	-0.118*** (0.036)	0.086 (0.064)
Quality of Life	-0.114*** (0.045)	-0.010 (0.075)	0.150*** (0.04)	0.018 (0.064)	0.047 (0.038)	-0.093 (0.067)
Education	-0.016 (0.024)	0.117** (0.053)	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.124*** (0.043)	-0.016 (0.020)	0.123*** (0.046)
Poor	-0.082 (0.06)	-0.151 (0.111)	-0.226*** (0.052)	-0.335*** (0.093)	-0.111** (0.049)	0.124 (0.098)
Female	-0.021 (0.098)	-0.384*** (0.147)	-0.015 (0.084)	-0.463*** (0.125)	-0.030 (0.081)	0.007 (0.131)
Age	0.002 (0.004)	0.008 (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)	0.008* (0.005)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.005)
Cons	-0.280 (0.323)	0.050 (.512)				
# obs	2264	974	2276	982	2203	963
Pseudo R ²	.0244	.0318	.1118	.1087	.0090	.0405
LR chi ²	68.57	39.02	674.12	307.74	53.77	92.38
Prob > chi ²	.0000	.0001	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000

Notes: *** $p \leq .01$ for two tailed test; ** $p \leq .05$ for two tailed test; * $p \leq 0.1$ for two tailed test

TABLE 5: ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY I

Est. Method	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
	Support Democracy (Chile)	Support Democracy (Nicaragua)	Satisfaction w/ Democracy (Chile)	Satisfaction w/ Democracy (Nicaragua)	Support for Authoritarian Government (Chile)	Support for Authoritarian Government (Nicaragua)
	Logit	Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit
Feel Safer	0.6105*** (0.1449)	0.3072** (0.1441)	0.7250*** (0.1254)	0.5156*** (0.1358)	-0.2366 (0.1318)	-0.0346 (0.1380)
Victim of Crime	0.0789 (0.1843)	-0.3046 (0.1879)	-0.0113 (0.1725)	0.1028 (0.1651)	0.2165 (0.1843)	-0.3021* (0.1759)
Discuss Politics	0.3767*** (0.1111)	0.3704*** (0.0987)	0.0182 (0.1255)	0.0377 (0.0863)	-0.4340*** (0.1084)	-0.0172 (0.0985)
TV-News	-0.047 (0.0545)	-0.04405 (0.066903)	0.0299 (0.0522)	-0.0222 (0.0570)	0.0104 (0.0654)	0.0245 (0.0649)
Service Delivery	-0.015 (0.0617)	-0.123** (0.0535)	0.1971** (0.0648)	0.1420*** (0.0524)	-0.0963 (0.0554)	0.0082 (0.0524)
Economy	0.3088** (0.1231)	-0.0029 (0.1174)	0.6488*** (0.1303)	0.3951*** (0.0940)	-0.3546*** (0.1110)	-0.2022* (0.1084)
Quality of Life	0.2837** (0.1201)	0.0178 (0.1067)	0.4262*** (0.1164)	0.2818*** (0.1007)	-0.1590 (0.1118)	-0.0763 (0.0947)
Education	0.0387 (0.0295)	-0.0118 (0.0228)	0.0491* (0.0294)	0.0045 (0.0193)	-0.0164 (0.0292)	0.0358* (0.0215)
Poverty	0.1861 (0.1395)	-0.0366 (0.1061)	0.1574 (0.1480)	0.004932 (0.0889)	-0.1292 (0.1443)	-0.1553 (0.1005)
Female	0.0174 (0.180683)	-0.2390 (0.1811)	-0.089 (0.1734)	-0.65567*** (0.1640)	-0.2321 (0.1685)	0.0396 (0.1764)
Age	0.0111* (0.0063)	0.0120* (0.0064)	0.0180** (0.0061)	0.011286* (0.0061)	-0.0133** (0.0062)	-0.0090 (0.0061)
Cons	-4.5247*** (0.7308)	-0.6752 (0.6975)				
# obs	1023	613	1040	652	978	648
Pseudo R ²	0.1020	0.0478	0.1292	0.0585	0.0503	0.0116
LR chi ²	85.54	30.44	165.28	81.41	91.60	14.01
Prob > chi ²	0.0000	0.0014	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.2326

Notes: *** $p \leq .01$ for two tailed test; ** $p \leq .05$ for two tailed test; * $p \leq 0.1$ for two tailed test

TABLE 6: ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY II

Est. Method	Model 10		Model 11		Model 12	
	Support Democracy (Chile)	Support Democracy (Nicaragua)	Satisfaction with Democracy (Chile)	Satisfaction with Democracy (Nicaragua)	Support for Authoritarian Government (Chile)	Support for Authoritarian Government (Nicaragua)
	Logit	Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit	Ordered Logit
War on Crime	0.3019** (0.1336)	0.3320*** (0.1180)	0.4495*** (0.1365)	0.3620*** (0.1107)	-0.3076** (0.1540)	0.0175 (0.1449)
Victim of Crime	-0.0176 (0.1896)	-0.2076 (0.1929)	-0.0202 (0.1776)	0.1336 (0.1672)	0.3079* (0.1854)	-0.2983* (0.1736)
Discuss Politics	0.4759*** (0.1216)	0.3663*** (0.1002)	0.0278 (0.1278)	0.0183 (0.0856)	-0.5392*** (0.1224)	-0.0111 (0.1003)
TV-News	-0.0327 (0.0568)	-0.0232 (0.0679)	0.0366 (0.0507)	0.0227 (0.0581)	-0.0301 (0.0666)	0.0333 (0.0660)
Service Delivery	0.0182 (0.0648)	-0.1179** (0.0561)	0.2107*** (0.0662)	0.1414*** (0.0526)	-0.0755 (0.0523)	0.0018 (0.0535)
Economy	0.4059*** (0.1296)	0.0094 (0.1179)	0.7059*** (0.1353)	0.4070*** (0.0937)	-0.3651*** (0.1141)	-0.1957* (0.1105)
Quality of Life	0.2248* (0.1226)	-0.0108 (0.1104)	0.4065*** (0.1146)	0.2658*** (0.1028)	-0.1088 (0.1243)	-0.0704 (0.0980)
Education	0.0384 (0.0309)	-0.0092 (0.0234)	0.0484 (0.0305)	0.0066 (0.0195)	-0.0234 (0.0311)	0.0350 (0.0216)
Poverty	0.1871 (0.1437)	-0.0438 (0.1099)	0.2208 (0.1464)	0.0152 (0.0908)	-0.0486 (0.1482)	-0.1292 (0.1021)
Female	0.0260 (0.1852)	-0.2137 (0.1839)	-0.0736 (0.1750)	-0.6451 (0.1668)	-0.1123 (0.1705)	0.1057 (0.1745)
Age	0.0080 (0.0062)	0.0143** (0.0065)	0.0149*** (0.0057)	0.0114* (0.0064)	-0.0102 (0.0068)	-0.0060 (0.0063)
Cons	-4.1139*** (0.7574)	-0.9637 (0.6937)				
# obs	1000	604	1018	640	964	643
Pseudo R ²	0.0903	0.0538	0.1159	0.0548	0.0542	0.0099
LR chi ²	74.65	32.55	133.45	73.55	96.83	11.75
Prob>chi ²	0.0000	0.0006	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.3831

Notes: *** $p \leq .01$ for two tailed test; ** $p \leq .05$ for two tailed test; * $p \leq .1$ for two tailed test

Results –Latin America: Chile and Nicaragua

Latin America provides a rich and heterogeneous sample of cases to study both the evolution of democratic reform and influence of crime. Gurr, Jagers and Moore (1990: 90) note that the patterns in democratic reform and development in Latin America are heterogeneous with few showing a “sustained linear progression.” Even recently, public protests have forced presidents in Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador to step down from office (Weitz-Shapiro 2006). In regard to crime, Aviles (2006) and Nef (1995) have suggested that violence and “generalized lawlessness” permeate Latin American society and history. Our main contention is that public safety, along with economic security, is crucial for democratic consolidation.

Using similar, we attempt to replicate the analysis of the African cases for Chile and Nicaragua. The results are quite similar (see Table 5). Perceptions of public safety are associated with both support and satisfaction with democracy in both countries (see models 7 and 8). These results suggest that respondents who felt the country was getting safer were also more likely to prefer and report satisfaction with democracy. Similarly, when considering government performance at crime control – is it winning the war on crime? – we find consistent relationships (See models 10 and 11 in Table 6). In other words, respondents who felt the country was winning the war on crime were also more likely to support democracy and report satisfaction with democracy. We also examined how perceptions of crime influenced attitudes toward authoritarian government. In only one model, and for one case (Chile - model 12) did perceptions of crime boost support for a non-democratic government.

A recent personal experience with crime – victimization -- was not found to be associated with support or satisfaction with democracy. In only one model for one case (model 12, Nicaragua) was there a statistically significant relationship. In that case, the relationship was modest and in an unanticipated direction; victims were *less* likely to support a non-democratic regime. This lack of a relationship between victimization and political attitudes may not be surprising if one reviews the criminology literature. Numerous scholars have found that direct victimization is not a strong predictor of public attitudes towards the police (Sarat 1977; McIntyre 1967), or even of fear of crime (Dull and Wint 1997). Instead, living in an unsafe area and anxiety about crime have greater effects on people’s daily lives and attitudes (Block 1971; Conklin 1971; Bureau of Social Science Research 1967).

Implications and Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued for the importance of including considerations of crime and safety in the analysis of the consolidation of democracy. We hypothesized that perceptions of frequent crime and negative assessments of safety would undermine support for democracy among the citizenry of emerging democracies. In general, the results of the analysis suggest that these factors do indeed compromise the formation of positive public attitudes toward democracy. Also important are popular assessments of government performance in the area of crime reduction.

The main unexpected result is that the experience of crime victimization, in and of itself, is not necessarily tightly linked to attitudes toward democracy. It may be that there is a certain threshold beyond which crime rates must climb before we see a relationship between experience with crime and political attitudes. The case of Nigeria suggests that when crime rates reach high levels, experience with crime itself has a negative effect on attitudes toward democracy. The results of the analysis are consistent across the African and Latin American cases. The link between perceptions of crime and safety and attitudes toward democracy are weakest for Malawi, perhaps because crime is not a salient issue there.

Since one of the most basic functions of any type of government is to supply law and order, we would expect a government's failure to perform this function to undermine support for the regime. In the emerging democracies, this scenario is likely to be most acute as the establishment of democratic norms and rules eases the restraints on individuals' behavior and weakens the ability of governments to use strong-arm tactics to maintain order. Where citizens perceive growing insecurity and an inadequate governmental response, we might well expect to see citizens become nostalgic for the old days of authoritarian rule or receptive to a new authoritarian alternative.

Much attention has been devoted to the effects of socio-economic variables on democratic regimes' likelihood of surviving and thriving. Our analysis indicates, however, that socio-economic variables only provide us with part of the picture. Feeling safe and secure is perhaps even more basic a need than economic wellbeing and an important determinant of people's quality of life. In addition, personal security, can be an antecedent or component of economic wellbeing since human security affects people's mobility and propensity to invest in economic ventures. The results of our study highlight the importance of including issues related to crime, safety and security in the analysis of the consolidation of democracy.

Although our hypothesis concerning the depressing effect of negative perceptions of crime and safety on attitudes toward democracy is largely supported by the reported results, all is not doom and gloom for democracy in Latin America and Africa. The majority of people in all of the countries of study still express support for democracy as a preferred form of government. The results of our analysis do indicate, however, that government performance in the area of crime and safety affects attitudes toward democracy. In addition, as the excitement around the transitions continues to wane, one sees less support expressed for democracy. Of course, the decline in support and satisfaction are quite normal. Huntington (1991) might even say they are part of the inevitable and necessary disillusionment that follows any regime transition. He observes, "The collapse of authoritarian regimes was almost always exhilarating; the creation of democratic regimes was often disillusioning." (1991, 168)

Nonetheless, the public sentiment toward the ideal of democracy and the way the political regime actually works should be closely monitored in the fragile emerging democracies. Over the long term, one would expect satisfaction with democracy to affect support for democracy. As Bratton et al. note, satisfaction with democracy is largely driven by people's assessments of government performance (2005, 83). Democracy cannot rest on its laurels of being an inherently legitimate form of government, as Diamond (1999) observes, democratic governments must perform.

Similarly, we argue that perceptions of safety and government performance in the area of crime reduction is integrally linked to the success of the consolidation of democracy. Modernization theory does predict crime rates to stabilize, but only when a society can create formal institutions of social control with the capacity to alleviate social disorder (Howard, Newman, and Pridemore 2000). Whether the emerging democracies in Africa or Latin America will be able to develop such institutions remains to be seen. Since the desire for security is universal, we expect our findings would be replicated in similar studies in other world regions. Future studies should explore the possibility of whether there is a threshold effect which crime must reach before crime victimization itself begins to erode support for democracy.

APPENDIX: QUESTION WORDING IN THE AFROBAROMETER

Dependent Variables

Support for Democracy

Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?

A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.

C: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.

Recoded so that the value on this variable is 1 if the response was A, and 0 otherwise.

Satisfaction with Democracy

Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in _____? Are you:

0=[country] is not a democracy, 1=Not at all satisfied, 2=Not very satisfied, 3=Fairly satisfied, 4=Very satisfied.

Try Another Form of Government/More Time

Which of the following is the closest to your views? Choose Statement A or Statement B

A: Our present system of elected government should be given more time to deal with the inherited problems.

B: If our present system cannot produce results soon, we should try another form of government.

1=Agree Very Strongly with A, 2=Agree with A, 3=Agree with B, 4=Agree Very Strongly with B

Reject One-Party Rule

There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? Only one party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.

1=Strongly Disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither Approve Nor Disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly Approve

Independent Variables

Experience with Crime

Two variables were combined to create a dummy variable for experience with crime over the past year:

Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family: Had your home broken into and had something stolen?

0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Sometime, 3=Often, 4=Always

Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your family: Been physically attacked?

0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Sometime, 3=Often, 4=Always

If the response to *either* of the above questions was *not* never, this variable was coded as 1.

Comparative assessments of safety from crime and violence

We are going to compare our present system of government with the former system of military rule (Nigeria)/one-party rule before 1994 (Malawi).

Please tell me if the following are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same: Safety from crime and violence?

1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better

Crime Performance

How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Reducing crime?

Response set: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly Badly, 3=Fairly Well, 4=Very Well

QUESTION WORDING IN THE LATINOBAROMETER:

Dependent Variables

Support for Democracy

With which of the following statements do you agree most?

- A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government
- B. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one
- C. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime

Recorded so that the value on this variable is 1 if the response was A, and 0 otherwise.

Satisfaction with Democracy

In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (country)?

[4] Very satisfied, [3] Fairly satisfied, [2] Not very satisfied, [1] Not at all satisfied

Support for Non-Democratic Government

Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements.

I would not mind a non democratic government in power if it could solve the economics problems

[4] Strongly agree, [3] Agree, [2] Disagree, [1] Strongly disagree

Independent Variables

Experience with Crime

Have you, or someone in your family, been assaulted, attacked, or been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months? Have you or someone in your family been aware of an act of corruption in the last 12 months? Have you known if any of your friends or someone in your family has consumed drugs in the last 12 months? Have you known somebody who has bought or sold any drugs in the last 12 months?

Have you or your family been victim of a crime

[1] Yes, [0] No

Comparative assessments of safety from crime and violence

Generally speaking, would you say that living in (country) is getting safer or more unsafe? Would you say its very safe, safe, unsafe or very unsafe?

[4] Very safe, [3] Safe, [2] Unsafe, [1] Very unsafe

Crime Performance

People have very different opinions. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each the following statements. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree:

We are winning in the war against crime and delinquency:

[4] Strongly agree, [3] Somewhat agree, [2] Somewhat disagree, [1] Strongly disagree

2003 Latinbarometer - Pooled (17 Countries) Ordered-Logit

Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with Democracy	Coefficient	Robust Standard Error	Z	P> z 	95% Conf. Interval	
Feel Safer	0.32492	0.03063	10.61	0	0.264887	0.3850
Victim of Crime	-0.12045	0.039404	-3.06	0.002	-0.19768	-0.0432
Discuss Politics	0.050754	0.022954	2.21	0.027	0.005764	0.0957
TV-News	0.033169	0.010191	3.25	0.001	0.013195	0.0531
Service Delivery	0.162934	0.012175	13.38	0.000	0.139071	0.1868
Economy	0.366319	0.02534	14.46	0.000	0.316654	0.4160
Quality of Life	0.228464	0.025019	9.13	0.000	0.179427	0.2775
Education	-0.00046	0.004726	-0.1	0.922	-0.00972	0.0088
Poverty	0.041394	0.024482	1.69	0.091	-0.00659	0.0894
Female	-0.08381	0.037965	-2.21	0.027	-0.15822	-0.0094
Age	0.003452	0.001255	2.75	0.006	0.000992	0.0059
<i># obs</i>	14125					
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	.0435					
<i>LR chi²</i>	929.06					
<i>Prob > chi²</i>	0.0000					

Control Variables

Variable	Description: A = Afrobarometer; L = Latinbarometer
RULING PARTY	Do you feel close to any particular political party or political organization? If so, which party or organization is that? Coded as 1 if respondent said felt close to the ruling party.
DISCUSS POLITICS	A: For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Discussed politics with friends or neighbors. 4=Yes, often L: How frequently do you do each of the following things? Talk politics with friends. 1=Never, 2=Almost never, 3=Frequently, 4=Very Frequently
TV-NEWS	How much attention did you pay to the political news on television?. 5=A lot, 4=Quite a bit, 3=Some, 2=A little, 1=None at all
RADIO-NEWS	How often do you get news from: the radio? 5=Everyday
SERVICE DELIVERY	A: Comparing the current government with the former military government, would you say that the one we have now is more or less: Effective in service delivery? Response set: 1=Much Less, 2=Less, 3=About the Same, 4=More, 5=Much More. L: Would you say that you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with... a. Health you have access to - b. Education you have access to - 1=Not at all satisfied, 2=Not very satisfied, 3=Rather satisfied, 4=Very satisfied [questions were added together to form SERVICE variable]
ECONOMY	A: In general, how would you describe: The present economic conditions of this country? Response set: 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good L: Same for Latinbarometer
QUALITY OF LIFE	A: In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions? 1=Very bad, 2=Fairly bad, 3=Neither good nor bad, 4=Fairly good, 5=Very good L: In general, would you say that you are satisfied with your life? 1= Not satisfied at all, 2=Not very satisfied, 3=Fairly satisfied, 4=Very satisfied
EDUCATION	A: How much education have you had? 9=Post-graduate L: How much and what type of education respondent completed. 1=Without education, 17=Completed university
POVERTY	A: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without: Enough food to eat? Enough clean water for home use? Medicines or medical treatment? Electricity? Cooking fuel? 4=Always (added together and then divided by 5) L: Does your salary and the total of your family's salary allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? 1= Does not cover them, there are great difficulties, 2= Does not cover them, there are difficulties, 3=Covers them all right, without great difficulty, 4=Covers them well, I can save
FEMALE	Coded by interviewer. Recoded: male (code=0) and female (code=1)
AGE	Value corresponds to actual age of respondent

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